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Abstract 
The European Union (EU) relies heavily on normative tools to exert power in world 
politics, such as the promotion of its own laws and standards. The most successful case is 
the EU enlargement process, which has contributed to stabilize the vicinity and transform 
candidates into market-based democracies by promoting alignment with European 
legislation and offering the prospect of EU accession. The European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) uses the same mechanisms that have made enlargement a successful policy, 
notably incentives-fueled reform. It does not however offer participating states a 
membership perspective and therefore most scholarly studies have drawn bleak prospects 
on its ability to promote reform. While cooperation in the ENP framework is not as 
intense as during the enlargement rounds, we find that some countries have indeed been 
making changes to their legislation and aligning themselves with the acquis 
communautaire, while other countries have not been so successful. By comparing norm 
implementation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs in the cases of Moldova and 
Ukraine, we show that differences are explained by the significant impact of domestic 
factors, such as contested state identities and domestic political battles over foreign 
policy.  
Keywords: European Union, normative power, norms, enlargement, European 
Neighbourhood Policy, Justice and Home Affairs, domestic factors, constructivism, 
rationalism, Moldova, Ukraine. 
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Résumé 
L‟Union européenne (UE) se sert principalement d‟outils normatifs pour exercer du 
pouvoir sur la scène internationale, notamment par la promotion de ses propres lois et 
standards. Le meilleur exemple est l‟élargissement de l‟UE, processus ayant contribué à 
stabiliser l'Europe et à transformer les candidats en des démocraties de marché, 
notamment en promouvant un rapprochement avec les normes européennes en échange 
d‟une perspective d‟adhésion à l‟UE. La Politique européenne de Voisinage (PEV) utilise 
les mêmes mécanismes développés lors des élargissements, notamment la promotion de 
réformes en échange d‟incitatifs financiers. Par contre, la PEV n‟offre aucune perspective 
d‟adhésion à l‟UE aux États qui y participent. Ainsi, plusieurs études ont conclu que cette 
politique ne pourrait engendrer les réformes escomptées. Bien que la coopération au sein 
de la PEV ne soit pas aussi fructueuse que lors des élargissements, on remarque que 
certains pays plus que d‟autres ont, malgré l‟absence de perspective d‟adhésion, fait des 
changements à leur législation en conformité avec les normes européennes. En comparant 
la coopération dans le secteur de la Justice et des affaires intérieures en Moldavie et en 
Ukraine, nous montrons que la différence s‟explique par l‟importance des facteurs 
internes des pays concernés, notamment l‟existence d‟identités nationales contestées et 
les batailles politiques intérieures portant sur la politique étrangère.  
Mots-clés : Union européenne, normes, pouvoir normatif, élargissement, Politique 
européenne de Voisinage, Justice et affaires intérieures, facteurs internes, 
constructivisme, rationalisme, Moldavie, Ukraine 
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Introduction 
In recent years, scholars have paid increasing attention to the European Union (EU) as a 
promoter of norms in the international arena. It is suggested that, unlike other world 
players, the EU relies less on power politics and cold military strategy than on normative 
tools as its preferred instrument in the international arena. Such policies of cooption tend 
to reduce the risk related to the arbitrary nature of nation-states by domesticating foreign 
policy. Relying on the predictability of law, the EU has come to tame sovereignty‟s most 
erratic and volatile behavior. This has favored the development of new forms of 
governance that are normatively based, among Member states but also between the EU 
and foreign states. The most salient and successful example of the EU‟s normative power 
is the enlargement, a process whereby in order to join the bloc, aspiring Member States 
are asked to implement into their legislation the acquis communautaire, a 170,000-pages 
rulebook of norms, standards and legislation. Through enlargement, many former 
communist and dictatorial states have embraced democracy, market-based economy and 
respect for human rights as core norms they defend and promote as their own. This can 
be explained by the fact that the EU is itself a normative project – the EU has emerged as 
a risk-averse, hybrid polity integrating supranational and intergovernmental elements. 
“The concept of normative power is an attempt to suggest that not only is the EU 
constructed on a normative basis, but importantly that this predisposes it to act in a 
normative way in world politics” (Manners 2002, 252).  
Since the 2004 enlargement, the most important foreign policy of the EU has been the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This framework applies to the EU‟s land 
neighbours in the East (Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine), to all of North Africa (Algeria, 
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Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia), to Middle Eastern states and territories (Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Occupied Palestinian Territory and Syria) and to the Caucasian states 
(Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia). It does not apply to Russia, which benefits from a 
„strategic partnership‟, nor to members of the European Economic Area (EEA) and 
Switzerland, which already implement the acquis into their legal framework without 
being part of the decision-making structures. Moreover, current accession candidates 
(Croatia, FYROM, Iceland, Montenegro and Turkey), European microstates and the 
Western Balkans “protectorates” are not included in the framework.  
ENP is a “cooperation” framework between the EU and its neighbours, but in a very 
peculiar sense. ENP is analogous to the enlargement process, in that it intends to promote 
the alignment of national laws with European acquis. The EU does so by offering its 
neighbours material incentives: “in return for concrete progress demonstrating shared 
values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, 
including in aligning legislation with the acquis, the EU‟s neighbourhood should benefit 
from the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU” (European Commission 
2003, 4, emphasis added).  
But contrary to enlargement, it is clear that ENP is not a path to membership within the 
EU. The aim is “to provide a framework for the development of a new relationship which 
would not, in the medium-term, include a perspective of membership or a role in the 
Union‟s institutions. A response to the practical issues posed by proximity and 
neighbourhood should be seen as separate from the question of EU accession”. As a 
normative policy however, ENP is problematic. The academic literature is clear on the 
limits of the normative and transformative power of the EU over neighbours when no 
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prospect for membership is offered. Indeed, most scholars have argued that material 
incentives were no replacement for membership and therefore that ENP had little hope of 
success.  
While we are far from the clear modes of influence witnessed during the enlargement 
rounds, ENP does seem work in some states, while it fails in others. Indeed despite the 
equal absence of membership prospect for all neighbours, the implementation of the 
acquis and other norms varies among countries. What is driving this differentiated 
compliance with European norms? Could it be that some neighbours are more receptive 
to EU norms than others? One thing that immediately strikes students of ENP is that the 
policy is aimed at states that have little in common with one another. From Algeria to 
Ukraine, neighbours of the EU have very different political systems and cultures, varying 
degrees of economic interdependence and unequal levels of human development. The 
current academic consensus on the limits of the transformative power of ENP, compared 
with the enlargement process, fails to explain why some countries within the 
neighbourhood do comply with some of the norms embedded in the ENP framework, 
while others do not. 
The current literature cannot elucidate this puzzle because it has paid scant attention to 
the domestic sphere – it has largely overlooked the internal make-up of neighbouring 
states and focused solely on the mechanics of ENP as a policy. Scholars have scrutinized 
thoroughly how norms were projected in the neighbourhood, yet have neglected to 
analyze how they were implemented. There is a tendency for Eurocentric points of view 
in parts of the literature that describes how norms are disseminated in a one-sided 
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process, leaving little explanation for the varying successes of the policy. The present 
dissertation fills this lacuna.  
ENP being a far-reaching strategy dealing with many countries, it would not be possible 
to examine all aspects of implementation within the limited context of this paper. We can 
however focus on a particular field of ENP and use that knowledge to infer on the larger 
picture. As a matter of fact, the structural constellation of EU foreign policy, which 
includes notably ENP and broader strategies of enlargement, has increasingly emphasized 
the importance of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). This includes notably border control, 
asylum provisions, and the fight against drug trafficking, issues that directly affect EU 
security while touching to the very core of neighbours‟ sovereignty. To what extent JHA 
norms are implemented in countries of the neighbourhood will determine a great deal if 
ENP can succeed overall – whether ENP can bring about change “will be decided first 
and primarily in the field of JHA” (Knelangen 2007). 
The first part of this dissertation considers critical theoretical frameworks drawn from 
sociology and International Relations to assess the identity of the EU on world politics. 
We show that the normative underpinnings of the EU favor a type of international power 
based on rules and norms that tend to include, rather than exclude, the near-abroad. The 
second part examines how the enlargement of the EU and consequently, of its 
neighbourhood, can be understood as a projection of European norms. Whereas 
enlargement and ENP both aim at the alignment of national legislation with the European 
acquis, we show that most scholars agree that ENP cannot induce major transformations 
because it does not offer the „golden carrot‟ of membership. We distinguish between 
norm projection and norm implementation to show that the latter, while usually 
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neglected, is crucial in explaining the uneven success of ENP. We argue that domestic 
factors have a significant impact on the success of ENP because they determine the extent 
to which an otherwise uniform policy is implemented in different national structures. In 
the third part, we reflect on the European Commission‟s „benchmarking of progress‟ and 
propose tools to measure the different trajectories taken by ENP countries with regards to 
JHA norms implementation. The differentiated norm implementation, the dependent 
variable, is evaluated by the distance between the commitments to reform in the mutually 
agreed ENP Action Plan and the actual accomplishments showcased by the 
Commission‟s Progress Reports. We compare the experiences and trajectories of two 
Eastern neighbours of the EU: Moldova and Ukraine. Both countries share a Soviet past 
and a similar geopolitical location, yet we find that Moldova has not been very successful 
in implementing JHA norms into its legal framework – there is an “implementation 
deficit” (Lampinen and Uusikylä 1998). This contrasts with Ukraine which has complied, 
not perfectly but to a certain extent, with the provisions set out in the Action Plan. In the 
last part, we explain this differentiated norm implementation by proposing two 
independent, domestic variables: the contested state identities and the domestic political 
battles over foreign policy.  
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In Search of an International Identity  
The nature of the EU and its international identity are hard to pin down. When he was in 
power, European Commission President Jacques Delors called the EU an “unidentified 
political object”. Since then, scholars have suggested new ways of interpreting the EU‟s 
international presence. For Rosecrance, the EU “represents a magnetic force in world 
politics” which has “reversed the balance of power and drawn other nations into its web 
of economic and political associations” (1998, 16). For others, the EU is either a “quiet” 
(Moravcsik 2002) or a “European” (McCormick 2006) kind of superpower. Robert 
Cooper (2000), a former adviser to Tony Blair and High Representative Javier Solana 
suggested that the EU is a “post-modern state” using “double-standards” in its relations 
with third countries. Zielonka (2007) has claimed that the EU is a “neo-medieval 
empire”, with fuzzy borders, multiple centers of allegiance and complex networks of 
power. The EU has famously been said to be “less than a federation and more than a 
regime” (Wallace 1983) and according to Fabbrini (2007) the EU is becoming a 
“compound democracy” increasingly similar to the United States and less to its own 
Member States. Weaver has highlighted its “postnationalist” tendency to disconnect itself 
from nation-states (Waever 1996) while others have simply dubbed the EU a “strange 
animal” (Cameron 2007). These analyses, regardless of the fact that they do not agree on 
the nature of the EU, all point towards the same central idea: a construction sui generis, 
one that is unique to its characteristics.  
In this chapter we will argue that the atypical structure of the EU, which combines 
elements of supranational and intergovernmental decision-making, favors a specific type 
of international identity that is rules-based and normative (Manners and Whitman 1998). 
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We will show how this normative basis is rooted in the Treaty of Rome and on the 
subsequent jurisprudential work of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on the one hand, 
and on the political traumatism that has do with specific events of contemporary 
European history on the other. Lastly, we will infer from this normative structure that it 
predisposes the EU to act in a normative way in world politics.  
The Treaty of Rome, the Court and the supranationalization of European law 
The EU has always been a unique polity. Yet when the Treaty of Rome was signed in 
1957, the exact nature of the newly created international organization was unclear, even 
for those who had drafted it. Would this treaty produce direct effects? Would it be above 
the constitutional dispositions of Member States? Would legislation adopted through its 
mechanisms be binding? The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has since solved these 
complex legal problems in various landmark decisions, notably in Van Gend en Loos, 
Costa v. Enel and Internationale Handelsgesellschaft. In these cases, the Court ruled that 
not only do treaty provisions have direct implications on individuals that the national 
courts must uphold, but also that even secondary legislation can overrule national 
constitutions. In other words, European Union treaties acquired a quasi-constitutional 
shine. From international public law, the 1957 Treaty evolved into the most advanced 
international organization in the world. What is most remarkable about these crucial steps 
of treaty constitutionalization is that they have not been the result of referendums or head 
of states decisions – they are the legacy of a slow jurisprudential work. 
The role of the Court in the creation of a supranational legal order is often underestimated 
and has long been understudied. It is telling in that respect that Rasmussen (1986), the 
first major scholar of the Court, wrote almost thirty years after the signing of the Treaty 
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of Rome. He argued that in the early years of the Community, the judges in 
Luxembourg over-reached their mandate by ruling repeatedly in favor of increased 
supranationalization. Through its decisions, the ECJ extended its own power and that of 
the Commission. He contends that the Court was guilty of “judicial activism” because it 
was essentially creating new policies out of the judicial rather than simply doing its 
interpretive job. It undermined democracy, he argued, as judges substituted elected 
representatives in Member States.  
Charges of activism are frequently made towards constitutional courts. In the United 
States, judicial lawmaking is the usual critique made by those supporting an “originalist” 
take on the Constitution, a method which aims at staying close to either the intent or the 
meaning of the original drafters. The primary alternative to originalism is usually called 
“constitutional constructionism”, an interpretation method that draws on the idea that 
Courts should take the dynamic nature of societies into account when interpreting 
constitutional texts. 
Indeed legal interpretation is neither an exact science nor a simple transposition to 
specific cases of policies devised by legislators. Treaties, like constitutions, contain 
values that may exist in tension, and not in harmony, with each other; courts must give 
meaning to them in the light of all other legal provisions and precedents. In the case of 
European directives – whose objective is legally binding but the means of achieving the 
result are up to Member states – they must be vague enough to allow twenty-seven 
national parliaments the space to legislate according to their own political context and 
methods. Furthermore, interpretation is rendered even more complicated by the fact that 
legal texts in any of twenty-three official languages of the EU are held in equal standing, 
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which means European judges must reconcile different versions of the same text. 
Obviously because of different legal traditions, concepts will not have the same meaning 
in all Member States, which means that judges need to fill in the gaps. In a famous 
English case
1
, the national judge emphasized this intricacy in the interpretation of the 
Treaty of Rome: 
“This Treaty is quite unlike any of the enactments to which we have become 
accustomed. The draftsmen of our statutes have striven to express themselves 
with the utmost exactness. They have tried to foresee all possible circumstances 
that may arise and to provide for them […] How different is this Treaty [the 
Treaty of Rome]! It lays down general principles. It expresses its aims and 
purposes. All in sentences of moderate length and commendable style. But it 
lacks precision. It uses words and phrases without defining what they mean. An 
English lawyer would look for an interpretation clause, but he would look in 
vain. There is none. All the way through the Treaty there are gaps and lacunae. 
These have to be filled in by the judges, or by regulations or directives. It is the 
European way.” 
What is this European way? In terms of legal interpretation, it suggests that the ECJ 
cannot rely solely on the meaning of the words. Contrary to most courts where literal 
interpretation is the usual way to go, the ECJ pays more attention to the objectives of the 
text – it is a teleological method of interpretation. This is made easier by the preamble 
and the first articles of the Treaty which set out the principles and goals on which rests 
the European legal edifice. The Court has used these repeatedly to judge in favor of a 
clear supranationalization of European law, and particularly in the early years of the 
                                                 
1
 Bulmer Ltd v Bollinger SA 
1
 [1974] Ch 401, 425 
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Community, against the short-term interests of Member States (Arnull 2006). A good 
example of this is the Van Gend & Loos case and the doctrine of direct effects. The idea 
is that the good functioning of the Single market – the main objective of the Treaty – 
requires that the legal rights thus created benefit not only states but individuals as well:  
The Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit 
of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields 
and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their 
nationals. Independently of the legislation of Member States, community law 
therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to 
confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage.  
One of the immediate consequences of the direct effects doctrine is that EU law takes 
precedence over national law. This supranationalization through jurisprudence came 
about not only because of the Court own legal flexibility, but also because of its ability to 
convince national judges that such a novel legal hierarchy was both inevitable and 
positive for Europe. At least three consequences resulted from this. Firstly, it bound EU 
Member States to comply with European norms, legislations and standards, even in the 
cases where this would go against their national interest. Secondly, it displaced the 
national state from the centre of concern and encouraged a fragmenting of power: 
horizontally as between Member States and vertically as between the various EU 
institutions. Thirdly, it favored the development of forms of governance that emphasize 
the centrality of law and away from the more traditional power politics associated with 
Westphalia and the modern nation-state.  
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A risk-averse polity  
The EU is also an atypical polity because it is averse to political risks. In the European 
Parliament for instance, the European‟s Peoples Party and the European Socialist Party 
will compromise on the vote and strike a deal to share the five-year presidency; in the 
Council, decisions are made on a consensual basis as often as possible. Unlike the United 
States or its own Member States, the EU has to some extent escaped politicization. 
Indeed, most of the political infighting takes place not at the EU, but at the national level. 
Some of this can be explained by the technocratic nature of the European Commission 
and its insistence that it works towards the general European good and above the political 
fray. Yet we argue that a large part is better explained by what we call “political 
traumatism” associated to previous unsuccessful integration projects.  
An early example like the 1954 European Defence Community (EDC) project illustrates 
how integration in a sovereignty-sensitive field such as defense proved to be too 
politically difficult and was abandoned. Paradoxically while the idea of fully integrated 
European forces remains a taboo in the political sphere, the sector actually witnessed a 
degree of Europeanization, including military cooperation projects and some 
harmonization of practices. This is because failures such as the EDC undermined other 
EU integration objectives that were deemed important, such as the effective creation of a 
single economic space. Deserted by national figures, the political vacuum of defense 
became occupied by supranational actors who could avoid the stumbling blocks and were 
able to integrate through norms. Every time Europe clashes into the unpredictability of its 
Member States, normative integration is used as an alternative way to achieve integration 
away from the glare of politics.  
 12 
The 1954 EDC was a French project guided by a need, on the one hand, to reinforce 
the European defense alongside Germany in the face of the Soviet threat and on the other, 
by European federalists wishing to apply to the military realm the principles of the 
Schuman Declaration that had inspired the creation of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC). The plan was first unveiled in 1950 by French premier René 
Pleven. It proposed “the creation, for our common defense, of a European army tied to 
political institutions of a united Europe.” Under the plan, the six European states 
negotiating the ECSC would renounce definitively national defense and commit all their 
military capabilities to NATO under a European command (Maury 1996, 94). A year and 
a half later the treaty was signed and there was an agreement that the United States and 
Britain, which were not part of it, would nevertheless cooperate with the EDC (Judt 2006, 
244). Yet French communists and Gaullists opposed the project on the grounds that it 
would mean a loss of national sovereignty. As de Gaulle puts it: “By giving [to the 
Community] our soldiers and our decision-making, we would lose all possibility to act as 
a state” (quoted in Maury 1996, 101). In 1954 the French National Assembly voted 
against by a vote of 319-264, following new Premier Pierre Mendès-France‟s refusal to 
make it an issue of confidence.  
The project of common European defense has since been a political taboo, let alone the 
idea of a European army. As realist thinkers have argued, defense lies at the core of 
sovereignty and even though European states cooperate in certain fields of mutual 
interests, they were not likely to lose their statehood to a supranational entity. To adopt 
an analogy first used by Hoffman (1966, 883-4) sovereignty is not like an onion that can 
be peeled away to nothing, but rather like an artichoke where the heart would remain 
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intact even after the outside leaves have been eaten. Neo-functionalists (Haas 1958; 
Lindberg 1963; Nye 1970; Pentland 1973), however, made the case that integration was 
more likely to happen in functional sectors of the economy through positive spillover – 
integration in one sector would create incentives for further integration in a related sector. 
Much of the “Monnet-method” of integration owes to this idea that political unity 
requires economic interdependence, something that would be achieved in a slow, 
incremental process.  
Although defense is located at the core of sovereignty and has been a political traumatism 
since the failure of EDC, there has nevertheless been some degree of harmonization in 
that sector. Realists are correct in their account of the output – states have not allowed 
political integration to challenge the core of sovereignty – while neofunctionalists rightly 
describe how the process has taken place in more functional sectors such as the single 
market. How can we explain the fact that there has actually been some integration 
without the political backing of the Member States? This is because the integration 
process in the field of defense has been normatively, rather than politically, based. The 
EU has preferred micro-steps with norms, regulations, directives and general 
standardization processes rather than radical attempts at displacing sovereignty that 
would have bumped inevitably into the opposition of Member States. Of course at some 
point the European Council will give its benediction– but most of the work will have 
been done previously. Other examples of integration through norms abound: the creation 
of the Euro, or the Schengen passport-free travel zone.  
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The EU as a normative power in the international arena 
The argument in the first two sections of this chapter established how the EU was built on 
norms and rules. Drawing from theoretical findings of constructivist and sociological 
schools of International Relations, we argue that this normative basis predisposes the EU 
to act normatively in world politics. In fact, most of the power of the EU originates 
neither from its military might nor from the sheer size of its economy, but from its ability 
to have its norms abided by foreign countries.  
Rooted in part in Max Weber‟s sociology, constructivism posits that individuals “are 
cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude 
towards the world and to lend it significance” (Weber quoted in Ruggie 1998, 856). 
Indeed the world can be divided, in the words of philosopher John Searle, in two types of 
facts: natural facts and social facts. While natural facts (such as rain, forests or the law of 
gravity) can exist independently of human agreement, social facts (such as sovereignty, 
justice, diplomacy or marriage) exist because of shared social significations and the 
presence of human institutions to support them. Their meanings are therefore constructed 
by “collective intentionality” and not given by nature (Searle 1995). In the study of 
international relations, constructivism considers the world‟s ontology to be built less on 
material givens than formed in values and identities. Knowledge on world politics can 
therefore be generated not by looking at facts “as they are”, but rather by studying the 
interaction between ideas and the institutions that frame and formalize our collective 
experience of reality. In a famous article Alexander Wendt argued that anarchy, or the 
common idea that the international arena is fundamentally distinct from the national 
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realm because it is characterized by the absence of a Leviathan, was not a natural fact 
but rather a shared belief: “Anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt 1992).  
Sovereignty/anarchy is among traditional dichotomies of international relations, with 
low/high politics and inside/outside borders that “are interesting less for the substantive 
explanations they offer about political conditions in the modern world than as expressions 
of the limits of the contemporary political imagination” (Walker 1993, 5). In political 
realism and other modernist-inspired discourses, state sovereignty and national interest 
are presented as timeless natural facts waiting to be discovered and revealed. Critical 
theorists have instead argued that these are shared beliefs rooted in the political thought 
of liberal modernism, the Enlightenment and the dawn of nation-states. Yet these 
prevailing ideas still inform much of contemporary International Relations as a discipline. 
In other words, unable to think beyond these aged dichotomies and regardless that 
anachronisms still constrain our understanding of ontological possibilities, we are 
reflecting on today‟s world using yesterday‟s concepts. Political realism must be read, not 
solely as an explicative theory of international relations, but as a constitutive practice of 
reality.  
This is particularly problematic in the case of foreign policy of the EU. Political realists 
have painted a picture of states as cold monsters selfishly battling for timeless interests. 
Here is one counter-example: in early EU history in the aftermath of the war, against the 
logic of an irrefutable and natural antagonism between French and German interests, the 
creation of a common authority monitoring the use of essential resources, coal and steel, 
actually became possible because both sides constructed their social identities in such a 
way as to marginalize aggressive nationalism. Certainly, France and Germany still 
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disagree on a number of issues. But who would dare to argue that today in their 
relations with China, the United States or in the Security Council, their interests are 
fundamentally opposed? As such an already misleading metaphor, realists still try to 
convey the idea that the EU, which is not a state nor aspires to be, nevertheless behaves 
in international politics as one. We reject the model of the EU as an actor that would be 
cohesive and unitary that the realists vainly try to establish (Bretherton and Vogler 1999). 
Instead, we argue that the EU is one of a kind, and that European power is sui generis.  
Here is why: the history of European integration can be read mostly as the simultaneous 
domestication of foreign relations and the permeabilization of borders through law. 
Indeed, the EU has relied on the legal predictability to tame sovereignty‟s most erratic 
and volatile behavior – during the last century aggressive nationalism became not once, 
but twice Europe‟s grave. The EU chose to transform foreign relations into home affairs, 
solving problems through institutions it consents to abide by, rather than with the muscle 
of power politics. The EU is a normative power – it uses norms and laws as the preferred, 
if not exclusive, instrument in the international arena. The contractualization of world 
relations on the basis of treaties and conventions owes much to the idea that interactions 
do not have to be a zero-sum game and that interests are not timeless material givens, 
contrary to what realists assert. In itself, the history of European integration challenges 
core realist postulates asserting state territoriality, fixed borders and the clear separation 
between internal and external security structures (Laïdi 2006, 63-5).  
The idea that the EU is a normative actor is not entirely new. During the 1970s, French 
author François Duchêne offered his “civilian power” concept, claiming that the 
importance of raw military power was declining while economic and cultural factors 
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were becoming more important in exerting international power. Writing at the height 
of the Cold war where the two superpowers were squeezing the nine-member 
Community, Duchêne claimed that “the nuclear and super-power stalemate in Europe has 
devalued purely military power and given much more scope to the civilian forms of 
influence and action.” He suggested that the EU had been playing civilizing roles at home 
between its Member States, and that it could do the same abroad: “this means trying to 
bring to international problems the sense of common responsibility and structures of 
contractual politics which have in the past been associated almost exclusively with 
„home‟ and not foreign, that is alien, affairs […] The European Community in particular 
would have a chance to demonstrate the influence which can be wielded by a large 
political co-operative formed to exert essentially civilian forms of power” (Duchêne 
1973, 19-20, emphasis in the original).  
In a seminal article that builds upon Duchêne‟s findings, Manners (2002) suggests that 
the EU pursues goals on the international scene that reflect its own normative 
construction. He identifies five norms that are central to the identity of the EU: peace, 
liberty, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights. He also includes four minor 
norms: social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good 
governance. These norms are a good indication of what the EU is about, but they can also 
tell us how the EU might behave in world politics – its international identity.  
In fact, the border between internal policy structures and external relations has been hazy 
from the dawn of European integration. Firstly, as we argued, because relations between 
Member States of the EU are at the same time foreign and home affairs. Secondly 
because most EU policies set out provisions which from the outset, apply also to the 
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outside world. While European institutions recognized this only recently (European 
Commission 1995, 2005a), the creation of a common market, for instance, meant 
something for foreign firms operating on EU soil. And the trade policy has since 1992 
provisions related to human rights (Orbie 2008). What is now called the “external 
dimension” of a European policy has been documented early in the scientific literature 
(Twitchett 1976), way before the creation of DG RELEX or Maastricht‟s pillar structure. 
Consequently unlike other world powers – that is, nation-states – the EU always had an 
inherent tension between “low” and “high” politics. However, the collateral effect on 
foreign countries of internal policies is not so atypical that it can be observed only in the 
EU; we can reasonably assume for instance that the United States competition law also 
has an influence on foreign countries. The normative power of the EU is astonishing 
however when the avowed objective is the implementation of its norms and standards 
into the legislation of foreign countries – in other words, when the EU projects its acquis 
communautaire towards the outside world with the clear intention of transforming it. 
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Enlarging the neighbourhood 
The enlargement process and ENP are salient examples of the EU‟s normative power in 
the international arena that directly challenge state-centric assumptions on the 
inevitability of the inside/outside dichotomy in world politics. In this chapter we examine 
how the enlargement experience in general – the evolution from six to twenty-seven 
Member States – and the Eastern enlargement of 2004 in particular can be understood 
foremost as a successful projection of European norms. We then assess why ENP, a 
policy devised towards non-candidate neighbours which uses most of the tools of 
enlargement has nevertheless been criticized as mostly ineffective. We follow by arguing 
that the major part of the literature has neglected to study how EU norms are 
implemented, missing some successes and attributing failures of ENP to a faulty design.  
Enlargement as projection of European norms 
It is commonly said that the EU is an “economic giant and a political dwarf” – the largest 
economic entity in the world struggles to have its voice heard in the international scene. 
There is however at least one foreign policy that has been quite effective: the enlargement 
process. Within 50 years, the bloc has evolved from six to twenty-seven Member States, 
contributing to stabilize new democracies, promote human rights, integrate the near-
abroad and foster growth region-wide. This has been possible because the EU has 
benefitted from a considerable power of attraction over aspiring members. In fact, in the 
1980s, Spain, Greece and Portugal were willingly brought in after the collapse of their 
dictatorships. A decade later with the fall of communism, a similar process followed in 
Central and Eastern Europe.  
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Following the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 and the fact that countries 
such as Sweden, Finland and Austria, part of the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) were expected to join the EU in the next years, Central and East European 
Countries (CEECs) leaders demanded some kind of pledge from the EU, a path of 
eventual accession. The aftermath of the collapse of the Berlin wall and the violence 
exploding in the Balkans showed that a clear promise of membership would empower 
reformers and promote peace and security. Yet at the time, EU Member States could not 
agree politically on the advisability on either widening or deepening the Union. Some 
like the United Kingdom claimed that more integration would make it harder for CEECs 
to ever join. France disagreed, arguing that “the Community should enlarge only after it 
integrated further, as a way of ensuring that a united Germany would be well secured to a 
more integrated EU” (Smith 2005a, 273). Still, most Member States were hesitant on the 
benefits of enlargement, particularly seeing that these would-be Member States were 
considerably poorer and more agricultural than the EU15 average. At the time (and to a 
large extent, still today), a substantial share of the EU budget went to the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) and on regional and structural funds. Consequently, those 
countries that were net beneficiaries would receive less than what they used to, because 
some of those funds would shift eastwards. In that regard, even those states most 
supportive of enlargement were uneasy. But it was hard to write off enlargement 
completely, as under Article 49 TEU, “Any European State” could apply to become a 
member of the Union. Faced with the political deadlock of having to decide on a calendar 
for enlargement, Europe created instead a norm. The 1993 Copenhagen European 
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Council declared that states could join the EU under certain conditions, now known as 
the Copenhagen Criteria:  
Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for 
and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as 
well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within 
the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the 
obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, 
economic and monetary union. (European Council 1993) 
Enlargement is not however like any other policy and its study poses a number of 
methodological, ontological and epistemological problems. It has been said that 
enlargement – or more precisely, its prospect – has been the EU‟s “most important 
foreign policy instrument” (European Commission 2003, 5). In aspiring countries, laws 
have been changed, constitutions have been amended, and practices have been brought in 
line with European and international standards. Indeed over the years, political 
conditionality has been used by the EU to transform neighbouring countries into market 
democracies, impose common standards on human rights and on the respect of 
minorities. It has given impetus for reform and rewarded successful applicants with the 
biggest “carrot” of all – membership into the EU. The 2004 enlargement in particular 
marked a turning point in European history by signaling the powerful attraction that the 
EU exerted over mostly post-communist candidate countries, which were willing to 
profoundly alter their institutions and make the necessary reforms in order to accede to 
the bloc. This is not to say that Eastern European Member States are now fully formed 
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market democracies. But rather that considering the historical background of divisions 
and wars, the Eastern Enlargement has been an unmitigated success story for the EU.  
The study of EU enlargement has witnessed many great debates. A first distinction can be 
made between macro and meso-political approaches (Dakowska 2009). Macro-
politically, enlargement can be understood as a process dominated by spectacular 
outbursts, such as the political statements made at European Councils. These studies will 
focus on the role of national governments and their conflicting interests, and use a 
materialist ontology and rationalist epistemology. Most of the studies in this field relate 
to the motivations for enlargement or on the “internal” impact on European integration, 
such as the economic consequences of enlargement (see for example Baldwin et al. 
1997). A meso-political view, by contrast, would put a greater emphasis on the “daily 
routine” of enlargement, on institutional power relations, on the inter-subjective meaning 
of norms, and would center on mid-level actors. An example of this would be the smaller 
but constant bureaucratic steps that are completed in the slow course of the so-called 
“enlargement negotiations”. Led by officials from the Commission and from the 
candidate country, negotiations consist on monitoring the implementation of the acquis 
communautaire into the national legal framework of candidate countries. In that view, 
high-level actors have only small roles in a big play, their final consent being merely 
ceremonial.  
It has been said that enlargement is a policy that becomes redundant at the very moment 
it is successful. Once a candidate becomes member, enlargement conditionality loses all 
of its appeal and simultaneously diminishes the EU‟s ability to steer its choices or bend 
its political trajectory. This apparent contradiction rests on the common idea that 
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enlargement is located at the border between foreign relations and the domestic front, 
between high and low politics, between the inside and the outside of sovereignty, and that 
therefore, enlargement is a borderline case of either International Relations or European 
integration theory. This paradox can be resolved by exiting the comfortable confines of 
the realist paradigm. Enlargement is not a policy sitting on the verge of two unconnected 
worlds, but simply a more clear-cut manifestation of the EU‟s usual projection of norms. 
This is crucial: the promotion of the acquis into national legal frameworks, no matter if it 
concerns Member States, candidates, or neighbours, is the usual modus operandi of the 
EU. As a normative power, legal instruments adopted at EU level (such as regulations 
and directives) ought to be simultaneously implemented in Member States, in candidate 
countries and in neighbouring states. How this is achieved differs but the overarching 
objective of norm projection remains.  
Another fracture line among scholars is how knowledge on enlargement is built. Did the 
EU enlarge because of rational, self-interested factors? Or rather because shared 
European identities and socialization made the EU wish to erase the continent‟s historical 
divisions? Schimmelfennig (2003) has provided an interesting conceptual model to 
understand the epistemological interplay between rationalism and constructivism. What 
he dubbed “rhetorical action” is the “strategic use of norms-based arguments”. The 
problem is the following: why in the context of unanimity those Member States that did 
not have a strong interest in the 2004 enlargement ultimately voted in favor? He argues 
that Member States supporters of enlargement justified “their preferences on the grounds 
of the Community‟s traditional pan-European orientation and its liberal constitutive 
values and norms” (2003, 77-8). In other words, pro-enlargement Member States 
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interpreted strategically community norms in a way that favored their interest. Anti-
enlargement states were “shamed” into opposing them. The EU as a whole remained 
trapped into this liberal rhetoric and had to enlarge, even against the interests of Member 
States that could have blocked the process. Building on Schimmelfennig, we admit that 
there is an element of EU self-interest in the enlargement process, such as the will to 
increase the bloc‟s relative power in the world, or to create a larger, more prosperous 
internal market. But it also owes to the very normative idea that democracy, a functioning 
market system and respect for human rights are better than autoritarism, planified 
economy and aggressive nationalism.  
ENP or the alternative to enlargement  
In a 1962 essay titled “Discord and collaboration: essays on international politics”, 
Arnold Wolfers wrote about “milieu goals” by contrast with “possession goals”. While 
not specifically about the EU, his insights on cooperation in international relations are 
valuable. A nation with milieu goals, says Wolfers, is “not out to defend or increase 
possessions it holds to the exclusion of others, but aims instead at shaping conditions 
beyond its boundaries”. Milieu goals do include an “element of national self-interest, 
however farsighted, that lead nations to improve the milieu by rendering services to 
others” (Wolfers 1962).  
With its objective of creating a “ring of friends” around Europe, ENP can be understood 
as a policy aimed at shaping the neighbourhood favorably without actually possessing it. 
The main assumption in terms of international security is, perhaps self-interestedly, that it 
is better to be surrounded by friends than by enemies. But up until the launch of ENP and 
the simultaneous „big-bang‟ enlargement of 2004, the EU had always transformed the 
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milieu by enlarging itself: “The history of post-Cold War relations between the EU and 
its non-EU European neighbours can be read largely as a history of the EU coping with 
the exclusion/inclusion dilemma by eventually choosing inclusion” (Smith 2005b, 757). 
Yet much of the discourse surrounding the 2004 enlargement became dominated by 
debates over „absorbing capabilities‟ and on the geographical „limits of Europe‟. In this 
respect, ENP was designed as an acknowledgment of the alleged „enlargement fatigue‟ in 
founding Member States. The key was to replicate some aspects of the enlargement 
process and gain from its transformative power without actually enlarging. Neighbours 
more similar to the EU would facilitate the maintaining of good relations, it was thought, 
and would avoid creating new cleavages – a “Fortress Europe” (Gordon 1989) or a 
“Velvet Curtain of Culture” (Huntington 1993). Arguably, continental integration has 
succeeded because Europeans opened their borders to the socializing virtues of 
commerce and agreed to pool their decision-making. Thus the projection of norms such 
as democracy, human rights, good governance and a functioning market system – 
although to some extent self-interested – was Europe‟s take at constructing harmoniously 
the interests and identities of the neighbourhood in a way that would smooth out the 
edges of the enlarged Union.  
“The enlargement will bring about new dynamics in the European integration. This 
presents an important opportunity to take forward relations with neighbouring countries 
based on shared political and economic values” (European Council 2002).  Indeed, ENP 
is a direct response to the challenges that arose with the 2004 enlargement. It 
acknowledges the need for a policy towards its new neighbours resulting from the 
pushing back of its borders – the enlargement of the neighbourhood. As Christopher Hill 
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has argued, the extension of the borders of the EU is “the most important of all the 
foreign policy implications of enlargement” (Hill 2002, 97). “With the Cold War division 
of Europe finally undone, a new fault line as appeared much farther to the East of where 
the Iron Curtain used to be” (Schmidtke and Yekelchyk 2008, 2). The idea behind ENP 
dates back to a 2002 General Affairs Council, where the Commission and the High 
Representative Javier Solana suggested coming up with ideas to rethink the relations of 
the EU with its new neighbours (Council of the European Union 2002). The next year, 
the Commission published “Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: a New Framework for 
Relations With our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”, which was the first exhaustive 
communication on the subject. The avowed objective was to “avoid drawing new 
dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the 
new borders of the Union” (European Commission 2003, 4). In 2004 the Commission 
released the “ENP Strategy paper”, an operationalized version of its earlier document. It 
said: 
The privileged relationship with neighbours will build on mutual commitment to 
common values principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, 
the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good 
neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable 
development. Commitments will also be sought to certain essential aspects of the 
EU‟s external action, including, in particular, the fight against terrorism and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as abidance by international 
law and efforts to achieve conflict resolution. (European Commission 2004a) 
ENP is a cooperation framework that applies to the EU land neighbours in the East 
(Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine), to all of North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco 
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and Tunisia), to Middle Eastern states and territories (Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Occupied Palestinian Territory and Syria) and to the Caucasian states (Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia). It does not apply to Russia, which benefits from a different 
“strategic partnership”, nor to members of the European Economic Area (EEA) and 
Switzerland, which already implement the acquis into their legal framework without 
being part of the decision-making. Current accession candidates (Croatia, FYROM, 
Iceland, Montenegro and Turkey), European microstates and the Western Balkans 
“protectorates” are not included in ENP (see figure 1).  
There are major similarities between ENP and enlargement that must be mentioned, in 
form and substance. In a seminal early study on ENP, Kelley (2006) has argued that these 
two policies are comparable because ENP has largely been modeled on the enlargement 
process. Drawing from organizational management theory and path dependency, she 
claims that the Commission wanted to extend the foreign policy power it acquired during 
enlargement through a new policy, in order to “continue playing a significant, and 
perhaps even stronger, role in external affairs”. The fact that “many of the Commission 
officials who worked on enlargement transferred to the ENP […] led to some direct 
mechanical borrowing from enlargement experiences”. She cites for instance many early 
drafts of the Action Plans which were “modeled directly on the association agreements 
used for the recent accessions”, or even references found in them about the Copenhagen 
criteria. Furthermore ENP, just like enlargement, is based on the benchmarking and the 
monitoring of progress. Indeed already back in 2002, Commission President Romano 
Prodi argued on the “need to set benchmarks to measure what we expect our neighbours 
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to do in order to advance from one stage to another. We might even consider some 
kind of Copenhagen proximity criteria” (Prodi 2002).  
Moreover, both policies are under the political control of the same Commissioner, whose 
full title is “Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy”. 
Enlargement and ENP are both aimed at transforming and stabilizing the vicinity through 
the alignment of national legislations, norms and standards with the European acquis. 
Indeed as Andreas Herdina, one of the principal architects of the policy puts it, “the 
majority of agreed measures consists of projecting first pillar Community policies beyond 
our external borders” (quoted in Lavenex and Wichmann 2009). In other words ENP is 
similar to enlargement: a projection of norms beyond the territorial borders of the Union 
in exchange of „carrots‟.  
The carrots are however not of the same breed. ENP is still based on political 
conditionality, yet the major difference with the enlargement process is that ENP is not a 
path to EU membership. Under the framework, neighbours must implement European 
law but doing so will not lead to a seat within the institutions. While the EU insists that it 
is not forcing ENP states to implement the acquis, “in order to participate in EU 
programs, harmonization with the relevant acquis may be required to fully reap the 
benefits of such participation” (European Commission 2010a). The incentives are not 
insignificant: it includes notably a perspective of moving beyond co-operation to a 
significant degree of integration, including a stake in the EU‟s internal market and the 
opportunity to participate progressively in key aspects of EU policies and programs; an 
upgrade in scope and intensity of political co-operation; the opening of economies and 
reduction of trade barriers; an increased financial support; the participation in 
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Community programs promoting cultural, educational, environmental, technical and 
scientific links; a support for legislative approximation to meet EU norms and standards; 
and a deepening trade and economic relations. In that respect, the most important 
material incentive in ENP is a privileged access to the Single market: “in return for 
concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, 
economic and institutional reforms, including in aligning legislation with the acquis, the 
EU‟s neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of closer economic integration 
with the EU” (European Commission 2003, 4, emphasis added). 
Norm projection and norm implementation 
ENP follows to a certain extent Romano Prodi‟s famous promise that the neighbours of 
the EU would benefit from “everything but institutions”; they would receive the same 
treatment and economic advantages of EU membership, except actual participation in the 
decision-making. It was clear from the outset that the will to improve the relationship 
with the new neighbours should not be confused with, and was distinct from, the 
membership possibility offered to European states (that is, states geographically located 
on the European continent). However, the literature is quite clear that ENP would be 
unable to shape the neighbourhood favorably without the prospect of the „golden carrot‟ 
of membership. For some reasons, norm projection seems to works better on candidate 
countries than on non-candidate ones. Therefore, scholars that have studied ENP have 
drawn bleak prospects of its success.  
Most authors who studied ENP in its early phase have stressed that contrary to 
enlargement, the incentives for reform are too minimal to induce transformation: 
“Whereas in the case of the CEECs the conditionality approach acted as leverage also for 
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unpopular adaptations, the lack of membership prospects or other attractive incentives 
poses serious limits” (Lavenex 2004, 694). ENP “follows the enlargement logic in the 
sense that it seems to rely on the same instruments, incentives, and normative 
underpinnings as towards potential EU members. However, since it rules out this option, 
the cost-benefit ratio is not the same as in the case of prospective EU membership.” 
Furthermore “in its present form, it does not provide relevant and adequate incentives for 
the political elites and the societies concerned to tackle far-reaching economic and 
political reforms” (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005, 37). “Without the membership 
perspective, the ENP countries might not be motivated to undertake domestic reforms” 
(Kelley 2006, 36). As Karen Smith adds, “ENP requires much of the neighbours, and 
offers only vague incentives in return. The hovering ghost of enlargement will not vanish 
if „all but institutions‟ proves to be meaningless” (Smith 2005b, 772). Again, “one of the 
underlying realities of the EU‟s transformative capacities [is that it] has been very much 
dependent on the offer of the „prize‟ of future membership and, when this is absent, the 
EU‟s powers of attraction diminish substantially” (Dannreuther 2006, 188).  
As these authors show, the case that conditionality works better on candidates than on 
neighbours is overwhelming. However, the main problem with this scholarly literature is 
that it has paid scant attention to the possibility that some countries within the 
neighbourhood are more likely to cooperate with the EU on a number of key issues than 
others, even when no prospect of membership is offered. Why are some countries more 
receptive to EU norms than others? The current literature cannot elucidate these puzzles 
because it has largely overlooked the internal make-up of neighbouring states and instead 
focused solely on the mechanics of the policy itself. Indeed there is a tendency for 
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Eurocentric points of view in parts of the literature that describes how European norms 
are disseminated in a one-sided process, leaving little explanation of the varying 
successes of this policy. This is why this paper focuses on the implementation of these 
norms.  
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Justice and Home Affairs as Norms 
This chapter will build upon the theoretical toolbox of the first two chapters and propose 
a methodology for assessing the differentiated success of ENP among neighbouring 
countries. The implementation of JHA norms, the dependent variable, will be 
benchmarked using three types of official EU documents: the Country Report, the Action 
Plan and the Progress Report. As we will show in our case studies, we find that Moldova 
experiences more difficulties than Ukraine in implementing EU norms in the field of 
JHA. 
A central pillar of ENP 
ENP is a very broad interdisciplinary project aimed towards the strengthening of 
democracy, human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and 
sustainable development. But it may well be that some policy areas within ENP are more 
significant to the chances of success of the whole project. Following Knelangen (2007), 
we argue that “JHA has a key role within ENP” and whether ENP can bring about change 
in the neighbourhood “will be decided first and primarily in the field of JHA”. The 
reasons for this are threefold.  
Firstly, the relative importance of JHA in the EU framework has greatly increased in the 
recent years. Indeed, if the successive completion of the Single market and the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) marked decisive steps in the history of European 
integration, JHA has emerged undoubtedly as one of the new frontiers of the EU. 
Secondly, the EU has acknowledged that security challenges permeate across borders and 
that cooperation with third countries is needed in order to reach its policy goals. Within 
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JHA, there are issues in which the EU is particularly dependent on close links with its 
neighbours, notably the fight against drugs, organized crime or trafficking in human 
beings. Since the 1999 Tempere European Council, the EU constantly stresses the 
importance of “comprehensive” or “global” approaches to JHA, involving notably the use 
of foreign policy instruments in order to engage third-countries into the EU security 
apparatus (European Council 1999; European Commission 2005a). Thirdly, in the cases 
of migration and asylum policies, the EU has increasingly framed border controls, 
readmission of migrants or the fight against smuggling and trafficking as security 
challenges that need to be externalized towards third-countries. This includes traditional 
tools of migration control such as visas or readmission agreements as well as „preventive‟ 
measures destined to deter potential migrants and asylum-seekers from entering Europe 
(Boswell 2003). But the need for cooperation and dialogue with the neighbourhood has 
become more acute in face of contradictions between these policies of externalization and 
the EU‟s international obligations, such as the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Statute of 
Refugee.  
Within the framework of ENP, JHA includes border management, migration regulation, 
readmission agreements, asylum, the fight against organized crime, drugs and money 
laundering, trafficking in human being, judicial cooperation and the protection of 
personal data. These are the policy fields we will more closely analyze.  
Benchmarking progress 
Like enlargement before it, ENP is very explicit on the importance of setting clear 
objectives in order to correctly benchmark progress. Back in 2003, the first Commission 
communication on ENP proposed the establishment of Country Reports, Action Plans 
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and Progress Reports. Country Reports were the first country-specific document 
published by the Commission, as early as 2004 for most countries, including for Moldova 
and Ukraine. The format of each Country Report is the same for all neighbours: the first 
part is an introduction to ENP and to the relations of that particular country with the EU, 
the second part is on political issues and the third is on the economic and social situation. 
There is no general conclusion. The document is not prescriptive, in that it does not yet 
give indications or injunctions as the way to go, and simply describes some aspects of the 
country. It does highlight a few challenges mentioned by other organizations, but does 
not give its own position, probably to emphasize the idea that the norms the EU promotes 
are not political. For instance:  
The 2003 Transparency International (TI) report on corruption in the world ranks 
Moldova in place 100. Public opinion polls rank corruption as the second most 
pressing problem in Moldova after poverty. In 2003, the Council of Europe 
Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) concluded that “the Republic of 
Moldova is without any doubt one of the countries deeply affected by 
corruption”. 
The second type of benchmark is the Action Plan. It is a political document agreed 
between the EU and the neighbouring country that builds on the Country Report and sets 
out a number of short and medium-term objectives. Each Action Plan is negotiated by the 
Commission “in close cooperation with the Presidency and the High Representative on 
issues related to political cooperation and the CFSP” (European Commission 2006a). The 
Commission first submits a draft proposal and a Country Report and then the Council 
issues a decision with the final Action Plan. It is stressed that “Action Plans should be 
comprehensive but at the same time identify a clearly limited number of key priorities 
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and offer real incentives for reform. Action Plans should also contribute, where 
possible, to regional cooperation” (Council of the European Union 2004, 12). Moreover, 
they are to “be based on common principles but be differentiated, as appropriate, taking 
into account the specificities of each neighbour, its national reform processes and its 
relations with the EU”. Indeed while the EU insists on the principle of differentiation in 
the sense that each ENP country should agree to an Action Plan that is both specific to its 
situation and tailor-made to its characteristics, there are striking similarities between the 
twelve Action Plans. This is even though neighbours of the EU are all quite different 
from each other. (So far, Action Plans have been agreed with all but four ENP countries: 
Algeria, Belarus, Libya and Syria. For Ukraine, an Association Agenda replaces the 
Action Plan, but while the name of the document changes the substance remains similar). 
In fact, it could be said that Action Plans use the same means to attain the same goals: 
give incentives, get legislative approximation. Obviously, when the EU speaks about 
“cooperation” or legal “rapprochement”, it means that neighbours should change their 
legislation to meet EU standards, and not the other way around. For instance, the 
EU/Morocco Action Plan states that 
the EU neighbourhood policy sets ambitious goals based on the mutually 
recognized acceptance of common values such as democracy, the rule of law, 
good governance, respect for human rights, market economics, free trade, 
sustainable development, poverty alleviation and the implementation of political, 
economic, social and institutional reforms. (European Commission n.d.) 
It would be easy to use the opportunity to denounce the EU‟s approach as being 
ethnocentric, but our point is rather that differences in national situations have not made a 
tremendous impact on the way ENP was designed. While some Action Plans focus more 
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on one policy aspect than others depending on the country, the overarching objective is 
still to get all ENP countries in line will as many aspects of the acquis as possible. 
However, whereas the Action Plan is not a legally binding document and there are no 
formal sanctions following a failure of implementation, there is nevertheless a clear 
political monitoring of progress made by the Commission in the implementation of the 
Action Plan. In fact since the end of 2005 when an overall assessment of the main 
achievements was carried out, the Commission has published annual Progress Reports on 
all the neighbours for which an Action Plan has been agreed.  
The gap between on the one hand, the Action Plan in the light of the Country Report and 
on the other, the various Progress Reports is an indicator of the approximate distance 
between the political commitments to reform and the actual implementation the acquis. 
The gap can be used to measure compliance with JHA norms, the dependent variable. We 
use the definition of compliance given by Jacobson and Brown-Weiss, which “refers to 
whether countries in fact adhere to the provision of the accord and to the implementing 
measures that they have instituted” (1995, 123). However, “one must be careful to 
distinguish cases of deliberate compliance from serendipitous compliance, where states 
actions fit international obligations but without deliberate choice” (Haas 1998, 18). We 
will supplement our findings with reports from Freedom House, the Bertelsmann Stiftung 
Transformation Index (BTI) as well as other sources.  
A differentiated implementation  
In comparative analyses, the first step is to define the scope of the enquiry. Within the 
ENP framework, most states are in a transition process towards democracy; it does not 
make them all akin. A comparative study of Ukraine and Tunisia, for instance, would 
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have stumbled into many obstacles. The most important one being that the membership 
perspective variable would fail to be controlled for. We have already stressed that ENP 
and membership were separate processes, but that Article 49 TEU did not preclude 
eventual accession for European states, even if very remote. Therefore if we search for 
domestic factors, we must absolutely neutralize external ones and compare countries that 
are geopolitically similar. We could have chosen to compare North African countries, or 
Caucasian states. But we thought that the influence of the EU was more likely to be felt 
on the European continent. In that regard, only three ENP countries can reasonably 
entertain equal EU aspirations: Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. EU relations with Belarus 
are however a bit frosty; in the context of ENP, no Country Report has been published, 
let alone an Action Plan. Belarus‟ embattled leadership has yet to express any desire for 
membership; it is still dubbed by the US State Department “Europe‟s last dictatorship”. 
We are left with Moldova and Ukraine: two countries of the near abroad that are 
comparable on many aspects, notably their shared firsthand experience of the Soviet 
Union‟s collapse, their quick inclusion into the ENP framework and their geographical 
location in the easternmost part of Europe. In this chapter, we compare these two 
countries, first by an overall assessment of their respective engagement with the EU, and 
secondly by benchmarking implementation of norms in the particular field of JHA. 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has enjoyed a relatively free media, basic 
protection of human rights and a pluralistic and competitive political arena. The 
Constitution, adopted in 1996 and amended in 2004 in the aftermath of the Orange 
Revolution, provides for a semi-presidential regime where the two executive offices share 
power. Leonid Kravchuk was the first president following independence. His mandate 
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oversaw a period of economic decline and high inflation. He was succeeded by Leonid 
Kuchma who brought economic recovery “but was accused of conceding too much to 
Russian economic interests” (BBC News 2010), controlling media freedom and not doing 
enough to fight corruption. In 2004 he chose Victor Yanukovych as his successor to run 
for the presidential election, facing Victor Yushchenko in the second turn. During the 
campaign, the government did everything to sabotage Yushchenko‟s campaign: 
“For six months, government-controlled national television had subjected 
Yushchenko to a steady torrent of negative press and distortions, while refusing 
him the opportunity to defend himself. Yushchenko's campaign faced other 
impediments as well. Sometimes his plane was denied landing privileges minutes 
before major rallies. Road barriers slowed his travel and, once, a truck tried to 
force his car off the road” (Karatnycky 2005).  
Furthermore, two months before the election, Yushchenko became gravely ill and was 
forced to leave the campaign trail, his face badly scarred. It was revealed that he suffered 
poisoning by dioxin. “The opposition cried foul, but the government-controlled media 
responded that Yushchenko had contracted the disease himself, by eating contaminated 
sushi, getting herpes, or undergoing botox treatment to preserve his 50-year-old good 
looks”. The day of the election, the authorities tried to rig the result in favor of 
Yanukovych. Some regions recorded a record turnout of 96%, way above the national 
average of 78% and with more than 97% in support for Yanukovych. Once it became 
known, massive demonstrations ensued. Images of protesters displaying orange flags, the 
color of the opposition, were shown around the world and in a surprising turn of events, 
the Ukrainian Supreme Court declared a re-run of the election. Yushchenko eventually 
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won. It was hailed as a major turning point in Ukraine‟s history, and a dramatic shift 
westwards.  
Just south of Ukraine is located Moldova, formerly known as Bessarabia and annexed in 
1940 by the USSR. Most Moldovans share ethnic, cultural and linguistic ties with 
neighbouring Romania, and during the turmoil years of 1989-1991, the leadership toyed 
with the idea of unification. The country eventually declared itself an independent 
republic in 1991. In the early years of independence, “Moldova was often praised by 
international organizations for its quick and courageous economic reforms compared to 
some other post-Soviet states” (Kennedy 2010, 64). The country had promising economic 
and trade potential, but much of that came to a grinding halt, however, when the issue of 
Transnistria – a separatist region located in the East and adjacent to Ukraine – evolved 
into an armed conflict with Russia. By 1993, the economy of Moldova had shrunk by 
about two-thirds of its pre-transition levels. “Without access to significant minerals or 
fuel resources with which to offset current account deficits, Moldova‟s economy was also 
slower to recover than other post-Soviet states” (Kennedy 2010, 64). The economic 
downturn was particularly harsh on the country and a conservative backlash resulted from 
the erosion of public trust in economic reforms. In 2001 the Communist Party, riding on 
nostalgic sentiment, was voted back in. The party won the 2005 elections as well and 
most economic reforms have stalled, even with non-communist ministers in the 
government. Moldova has become one of the poorest countries in Europe, relying on 
migrant remittances as the main source of capital.  
Moldova and Ukraine made generally uneven progress implementing European norms in 
general and achieving democracy in particular. While Ukraine has known highs and lows, 
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Moldova has been stalling since 2001, and the entry into force of the ENP Action Plan 
did nothing to change this situation. We can see this is the case with Freedom House‟s 
ratings for transiting states, which measures democracy around the world by quantifying 
seven concepts: electoral process, civil society, independent media, national democratic 
governance, local democratic governance, judicial framework and independence, and 
corruption (see Figure 1 and 2 – low values are better). The democracy score of Ukraine 
peaked at 4.88 in 2004 when ENP was launched, and then steadily made slight progress. 
It went from being classified as “partly free” in 2005 to “free” in 2006, notably as a 
consequence of the annulment of the fraudulent election result leading to the Orange 
Revolution. It has since then remained “free”. Moldova, on the contrary, interestingly 
also received 4.88 in 2004, but did not make significant progress and instead stagnated at 
around 5 for the period under review. It has continued being classified as “party free”.  
In another important data set, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), Ukraine also 
did better than Moldova. The BTI measures progress made by countries towards 
democracy and market-based economy, notably in implementing liberal norms and 
standards, and aligning itself with international conventions and instruments. We can 
visualize (figure 2) that Ukraine‟s performance is in overall better than Moldova‟s. 
Concerning the specific indicators related to democracy, Ukraine still does better on 
average, although this is mitigated in the case of the “stability of democratic institutions” 
and “political and social integration”, perhaps because of the political instability of the 
2004-2005 Orange Revolution. (On a related note, those countries that joined the EU in 
2004 and 2007 still enjoy a considerable lead over both Moldova and Ukraine – accession 
for those two countries is indeed far-off – see figure 3).  
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Both Moldova and Ukraine approved their Action Plan at the same time in early 2005 
(European Commission 2005b). Yet Ukraine has been reforming at a faster pace than 
Moldova, also because Ukraine has been more ambitious in its commitments in the 
general framework of ENP. In 2006 following the Orange Revolution, the re-run election 
was deemed free and fair by EU and international observers. In Moldova the 
parliamentary elections at the end of 2010 were deemed to meet many international 
standards according to a press release from OSCE, “but further improvements are 
needed”. In Ukraine the Commission recognized in its 2006 Country Report that 
“considerable steps have been taken towards consolidating respect for human rights and 
the rule of law” (European Commission 2006b) and in 2008, the country became the 
World Trade Organization's 152nd member. A visa dialogue was launched the same year. 
In 2009, Ukraine‟s Action Plan evolved into an Association Agenda, which includes talks 
for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Negotiations are already 
ongoing while they have not started in Moldova. In the EU‟s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), Ukraine aligned itself with nearly all CFSP position open to third 
countries and was also active in regional peace building.  
In the particular case of JHA norms, Moldova generally experiences more problems than 
Ukraine. The most outstanding achievement in Moldova and the one most repeatedly 
showcased by the Commission is one that also includes Ukraine: the EU Border 
Assistance Mission (EUBAM). It was set up in 2005 as a structure intended to control the 
traffic on the border of both countries, to rein in illegal traffic of goods and persons, as 
well as irregular migratory movements. In the words of the Commission, it “aims to bring 
transparency at the Moldovan-Ukrainian border and to foster a business environment that 
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demonstrates to economic operators, including those in Transnistria, the advantages of 
working on the basis of Moldovan legislation to benefit from international and EU trade 
preferences” (European Commission 2010b). However still in the field of border 
management, the Moldovan government committed to reform its border guard services to 
transform them into a law enforcement agency; this still has not been done, according to 
the EU‟s Progress Reports.  
In the field of asylum, the Progress Reports note that while some amendments have been 
made to the national refugee law, major improvements are still needed. Concerning the 
fight against organized crime, including trafficking in human beings, the Commission 
notes that while Moldova has ratified the UN Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime and its protocols on smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons, 
implementation was still lacking: “effective implementation of these international 
instruments is of great importance”, stresses the Commission. Furthermore, “despite 
these efforts, more progress is needed to punish acts of trafficking, to protect and 
reintegrate victims, to implement the witness protection law and to assist NGOs and 
international organizations in their work” (European Commission 2006c). It also adds 
that “cooperation with civil society in this area needs to be consolidated in order to 
prevent trafficking and provide rehabilitation assistance to its victims” (European 
Commission 2008).  
The sectors of fight against drugs and money laundering are of those where compliance 
with European norms is most lacking. The Commission highlights that reports from the 
Dublin Group, part of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “point to a growth 
in drug-related problems in Moldova”. This is because “implementation is hampered by a 
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lack of human resources, financial means and experience, as well as technical 
equipment” (European Commission 2006c). “Further attention and resources need to be 
invested in implementing these reforms” (European Commission 2008). In police and 
judicial co-operation, most measures agreed in the Action Plan had either not been 
adopted, had stalled in the parliament or lacked effective execution. The Progress Reports 
highlights that Moldova still needs to ratify relevant international conventions in criminal 
and civil law; improve inter-agency co-operation, develop risk-analysis methods 
comparable to those of the EU and establish a network of contact points with EU member 
states.  
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Two Determinants of Compliance 
How can we explain this „implementation deficit‟ (Lampinen and Uusikylä 1998) on the 
Moldovan side? In this chapter, we seek to give this differentiated norm implementation a 
theoretical and empirical explanation. Our hypothesis is that domestic factors have a 
significant impact on the success of ENP. Two independent variables are examined: the 
contested state identities and the domestic political battles on foreign policy.  
Obviously, we do not claim that domestic factors are the sole explanation of the 
differentiated implementation of JHA norms in the European neighbourhood. Social 
sciences in general and International Relations in particular frown upon mono-causal 
explanations. Other elements might be at play, such as world-systemic influences, 
internal politics of the EU, or the inherent contradictions within the ENP policy. 
However, this research seeks to highlight the significant impact domestic factors have in 
the success or failure of ENP.  
Contested state identities 
The first variable is the extent to which state identities are contested. In a study on the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), Del Sarto (2006) argues that “domestic conflicts 
over state identities put a strain on the ability of states to consistently engage in Euro-
Mediterranean region-building and to develop a strategy toward regional security”. EMP 
– a predecessor of sorts to ENP – was launched in 1995 at the Conference of Barcelona. 
It “can be seen as an original experiment of constructing a security region” which 
“emphasized the importance of common interests, common problems, and shared 
regional features” (Del Sarto 2006, 2). It is a distinctive regional peace process in large 
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part because of its unusual understanding of security. Indeed, the 1990s saw the 
relatively peaceful and unexpected ending of the Cold war and in turn, a renewed interest 
in IR approaches that sought to redefine the meaning of security. These studies, which are 
not unconnected with Duchêne‟s definition of civilian power, depart from the traditional 
focus on military issues to give greater importance to cultural, economic and human 
security. The creation of EMP must be understood within this intellectual context.  
We must be careful however because ENP is not exactly like EMP. Multilateralism, a key 
aspect of EMP, has made way to bilateral agreements while region-building has fallen out 
of the agenda. On the contrary, ENP recognizes that EU neighbours are an eclectic 
grouping: “given these different starting points and objectives it is clear that a new EU 
approach cannot be a one-size-fits-all policy” (European Commission 2004b). Yet as we 
have already argued, the objectives remain the same among countries. Just like EMP, 
ENP seeks to reshape the relation between the EU and its neighbouring states by stressing 
that they share the same challenges: “Proximity, Prosperity and Poverty”. (On a side note, 
it seems as if the Commission is guided, particularly for its flagship initiatives, by 
esthetic choices rather than sound policymaking; one might be forgiven to wonder why 
they happen to be so memorable – for another bewildering example, see the EU‟s climate 
change policy by 2020.) 
Another decisively common aspect to ENP and EMP is the fact that both policies deal 
with these „common‟ challenges by exporting the liberal set of values and norms that 
underpins the acquis communautaire, such as democracy, marked-based economy or 
human rights, and by branding them as „jointly owned‟. In spite what the Commission 
claims, in order to succeed it would “necessitate the emergence of common of interests, 
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values [and] shared beliefs” (Del Sarto 2006, 24) that do not necessarily exist. 
Cooperation in the field of JHA – which includes mostly provisions about security – 
therefore implies “a reconsideration of how a state defines itself and how it relates to 
other states”. The unsettled identity of a state puts a strain on its ability to engage in 
security terms because “a state cannot consistently define who its enemies and its friends 
are as long as it does not know what, or „who‟ it is”. Therefore, “these questions cannot 
be clearly answered as long as the political design of the state is contested at the domestic 
level” (Del Sarto 2006, 24). Contested state identities could be measured by asking the 
following questions: Are there major ethnic or linguistic divisions? Is there a profound 
religious-secular fault line? Do ideological cleavages have a strong influence on domestic 
politics? If the answer is strongly positive then we can expect that it will negatively affect 
JHA cooperation. 
In that respect, a crucial explanation of Moldova‟s lesser engagement in ENP can be 
found in the fact that the state identity is not recognized by all segments of the 
population. In fact, Moldova‟s state identity is heavily contested and since independence, 
most political efforts have gone into consolidating the nation-state rather than towards 
pro-European reform. This is not the case in Ukraine, although the country also had to 
face some secessionist movements.  
Indeed, while there are major ethnic and linguistic divisions in Ukraine, they have not 
threatened the identity of the nation-state, nor induced competing claims of sovereignty 
like in Moldova. According to the 2001 census, Ukraine is made of Ukrainians (77.8%), 
Russians (17.3%), Belarusians (0.6%), Moldovans (0.5%), Crimean Tatars (0.5%), 
Bulgarians (0.4%), Hungarians (0.3%), Romanians (0.3%), Polish (0.3%), Jewish (0.2%) 
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and others (1.8%). Therefore two big groups, Ukrainians and Russians, comprise the 
bulk of the population and the rest account for less than 5%. Victor Yushchenko of „Our 
Ukraine‟ was based mostly in the Western and Northern parts of the country. Most ethnic 
Russians live in the Eastern and Southern part of the country, a fact visible in the voting 
results (compare figure 4 and 5). In the 2004 presidential election for instance, the „Party 
of Regions‟ and its leader, Victor Yanukovych of the pro-Russian „Party of Regions‟ 
enjoyed wide popular support in the East and South, even though the party lost power in 
the aftermath of the Orange Revolution. While the party strives to make Russian the 
second official language, it has not done so by rejecting the nation-state: the BTI report 
stresses that “the Ukrainian nation-state is accepted by all relevant actors and groups in 
Ukraine”, which has “thus emerged as a civic nation” (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009b). The 
„Party of the Regions‟ has since reclaimed power and its electoral program “recognizes 
the role of the Ukrainian language as a symbol of the Ukrainian state” but opposes the 
“exclusion of other languages, especially Russian” (Party of Regions 2010). Obviously, 
recognizing the plurality of languages does not equate to claiming competing 
sovereignty.  
Ukraine has nevertheless faced some separatism, both in the autonomous Southern region 
of Crimea, as well as in two Eastern regions together known as the Donbas. The Donbas 
are “often portrayed as the last frontier of Europe in both a literal and symbolic sense. 
[…] To many, they represent the least European area – the area least amenable to 
European civilization and democracy” (Kuromiya 2008, 97). Indeed these regions are far 
from the center of Europe, border Russia and are populated mostly by Russophones. 
Images of the Donbas in the rest of Ukraine are mostly negative, the region being “known 
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as an unmanageable place, alien to culture and civility”, sometimes even portrayed as 
anti-Ukrainian for its historical pro-Russian stance. During the repeated second turn vote 
of the 2004 presidential election, the Donbas voted overwhelmingly in favor of Victor 
Yanukovych, a candidate hailing from the region, despite the fact that he had twice 
served jail time for violent crimes and that he tried to rig the elections in his favor. As a 
coal-and-steel industrial region however, the Donbas are hard to dismiss: 30% of total 
exports come from there. In spite of being close to Russia, the Donbas supported, during 
the 1991 referendum and like the rest of the country, the independence of Ukraine. Yet 
the post-Soviet collapse of the economy hit harder in the Donbas, for which Kiev was 
blamed for mishandling. It accused the capital of favoring Western regions at the cost of 
the Donbas and in 1993, huge strikes erupted, most of them being supported by locale 
elites. The struggle appeared to be between the Donbas and the rest of the country, and 
for a while, threatened the unity of the country. In 1994 when Kuchma was elected 
president with the vast support of the Donbas, demands for independence were not 
satisfied but several economic and political concessions we made. “Despite a host of 
scholarly works emphasizing regional splits, the polls suggest that even the citizens of the 
most disaffected Donbas think of their future in terms of an independent Ukraine” 
(Kuromiya 2008, 97). 
The picture is much different in neighbouring Moldova. The 2004 census shows – just 
like Ukraine – a multi-ethnic country: it is composed of Moldovans/Romanians (78.2%), 
Ukrainians (8.4%), Russians (5.8%), Gagauz (4.4%), Bulgarians (1.9%) and others 
(1.3%). However unlike Ukraine, multi-ethnicity does not translate into a clear 
acceptance of the Moldovan nation-state by all segments of the population. Indeed, the 
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most important challenge to state identity comes from Transnistrian separatism. 
Located mostly in a strip between the Dniester River and the Moldovan border with 
Ukraine, the so-called Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR), or Transnistria, has 
been a de facto, non-recognized state that has escaped the authority of the Moldovan 
government. This area is populated by a greater number of ethnic Ukrainians and 
Russians than in the rest of Moldova. Transnistria has known times of relative autonomy 
during the twentieth century, but the end of bipolarity has meant, as in many other places 
in Europe‟s edges, renewed possibility for expressing otherwise latent nationalism. In 
1989 three city governments located in the strip, Tiraspol, Bender and Râbnita, refused to 
acknowledge the new language laws approved by the Moldovan Parliament. These laws 
made Moldovan the only official language, retaining Russian solely for secondary 
purposes and declaring a Moldovan-Romanian common identity. Starting then, the 
breakaway territory ignored all further laws adopted by the Parliament: “this began the 
transfer of authority from national to local institutions and the development of a 
competing claim of sovereignty and identity” (Roper 2005, 502).  
As a result in 1991 and 1992 violence flared between Moldovan forces and the Russia-
backed PMR regime. Over the last decade, many negotiations on the future status of the 
entity were unsuccessful, and the conflict remains the dominant issue in Moldovan 
politics (Roper 2005). Against the will of the Transnistrian leadership, a 2006 agreement 
between Ukraine and Moldova provided that all Transnistrian exports to Ukraine ought to 
be stamped by Moldovan authorities (BBC News 2007). Russia, on behalf of 
Transnistria, retaliated with a ban on the import of wine products from Moldova into 
Russia, resulting in significant negative consequences for the Moldovan economy. This 
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has led “successive Moldovan governments to bend over backwards to accommodate 
Moscow as the key backer of the PMR regime in Tiraspol”, demonstrating “Moldova‟s 
political and economic dependency on Russia” (Roper 2005, 503). While Transnistria has 
only received the international recognition of three other non-UN, secession-seeking 
entities in Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia, it has kept functioning de 
facto executive, legislative and judicial branches. PMR has “remained virtually 
independent of Moldova” and its leaders “sought to portray differences as based on 
ethnic and linguistic rights”. Indeed, “the debate between the Moldovan central 
government and the breakaway region of Transnistria has been the primary focus of these 
competing visions of identity”, putting “constraints on any pro-European reform 
endeavors” (Roper 2005, 503). The existence of the PMR and its contestation of national 
identity hinders cooperation in the field of JHA because it weakens the fragile authority 
of the Moldovan state and its ability to legislate in the field of security, with 
consequences felt in the EU: “the Dnjestr Republic has become a black hole of the global 
economy, a hotspot of organized crime, trafficking and bootlegging” (Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2009a).  
There has been another, albeit less violent, challenge to the central authority of Moldova 
known as Gagauzian separatism. Located in the South of the country, Gagauzia (or 
Gagauz Yeri) is populated with Turkic-speaking, orthodox Christians whose ancestors 
have fled persecution in the Ottoman Empire during the 19
th
 century. In the December 
1991 referendum, 95% of the population voted in favor of the independence of Gagauzia, 
while the Moldovan presidential election was boycotted by the regional authorities. 
Separate elections were held in which the leader of a secessionist movement, Stefan 
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Topal, won over 90% and became the first president of the unrecognized Gagauz 
Republic. Martial law was declared over the secessionist entity by the Moldovan central 
government, until an agreement was reached in 1994 conceding autonomy to the region. 
Gagauzia has maintained links with the breakaway entity of Transnistria, despite the 
frozen conflict with the Moldovan government (Katchanovski 2006).  
Domestic political battles on foreign policy 
The second variable is influenced by the literature on Europeanization and from the 
debates on Member States compliance with EU law that emerged at the end of the 1980s. 
This period coincides with the undertaking of the completion of the Single market and its 
massive legislative programme comprising some 300 measures. Both academics and the 
European Commission started to take a greater interest in the alleged „implementation 
deficit‟ of European directives, that is, whether enough effort was put by Member States 
to “make European policies work” (Siedentopf and Ziller 1988). “Whereas progress at 
the legislative stage was impressive, Member States‟ compliance with the programme 
turned out to be poor” (Mastenbroek 2005, 1104). While some Member States, such as 
the United Kingdom, have traditionally been rather successful in implementing EU 
legislation, others like Italy and France are often criticized and brought to Court by the 
European Commission, under Article 259 TFEU, for failing to correctly implement a 
directive. The problem, in academic terms, is to explain the differentiated compliance 
among Member States in implementing the agreed measures into their legislative corpus.  
As Mastenbroek argues, “the first wave of scholarship on EU compliance was highly 
variegated”, lacking “strong theoretical frameworks, combining insights from 
implementation research, international relations theory and legal studies” (2005, 1104). 
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Many explicative factors were put forward or tested, but they revolved around the 
problem of institutional efficiency (Treib 2008, 1). These include the national 
constitutional characteristics (Krislov et al. 1986), the complexity of directives (Weiler 
1992), the complexity of the existing national laws (Collins and Earnshaw 1992) and 
gold-plating (Dimitrakopoulos 2001). A new wave of research called the “goodness of 
fit” took the lead in the late 1990s. It sought to explain the diverging impact the EU had 
on its Member states and came to be included within the broader field of studies on 
Europeanization (Héritier 1995, 2001). Rooted in neo-institutionalist theory, it moved 
from institutional efficiency to institutional compatibility. Indeed, these scholars “pointed 
to the degree of fit or misfit between European rules and existing institutional and 
regulatory traditions as one of the central factors determining implementation 
performance” (Treib 2008, 8). “The argument is that in cases of high adaptation pressure, 
implementation of European requirements is likely to be ineffective, since European 
policies require fundamental changes of core structures and practices of national 
institutions” (Haverland 2000, 84). Yet, various empirical studies have later shown 
disappointing results for the goodness of fit hypothesis (see Haverland 2000; 
Mastenbroek and Keulen 2006). For instance, Knill and Lenshow (1998) show that 
compliance with four environmental directives were implemented rather well by the 
United Kingdom even though this implied major changes to existing institutions, while 
Germany had great difficulties implementing even incremental changes despite an almost 
perfect fit. These empirical studies highlight that “a good fit is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for smooth compliance” (Mastenbroek 2005, 1109). One reason 
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could be that the goodness of fit posits a dubious and static appetite among national 
actors for keeping the status-quo (Treib 2003). 
A more promising, constructivist approach is modeled along the lines of sociological 
institutionalism. Compliance is theorized “as a process of substantive assessment of 
international rules in the face of pre-existing domestic norms and beliefs” (Mastenbroek 
2005, 1112). It is therefore not measured in binary and static terms (compliant or not 
compliant) but rather looks “to see how European norms relate and interact with different 
domestic norms” (Dimitrova and Rhinard 2005, 2). “Such studies start from the 
assumption that a rule will be complied with if it is deemed appropriate by the 
stakeholders. If not, compliance will not be automatic and hence more time-consuming 
and dependent on a process whereby the rule becomes internalized through socialization, 
persuasion, or learning” (Mastenbroek 2005, 1112).  
How can measure if norms are deemed appropriate by stakeholders? Realist scholars 
argue that a recurring problem with studies that emphasize the centrality of norms in 
world politics is that they understate – some say completely neglect – the importance of 
power in response to those norms. They claim that states react selfishly according to 
national interest and therefore that compliance with norms depends heavily on state 
preference. Liberals usually concur that power is important in determining the outcome 
of state behavior, but they argue that the national preference is not a natural fact waiting 
to be discovered, but rather the result of domestic political battles – those who are at the 
top have a decisive influence on the behavior of a state in world politics. Within this 
liberal conception of politics, the state is not an actor but rather an institution that 
balances the diverging interests of its constituents in order to create policy out of 
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contradicting claims. As Moravcsik (1997) argues, “representative institutions and 
practices constitute the critical „transmission belt‟ by which the preferences and social 
power of individuals and groups are translated into state policy”. This is not to say that all 
individuals and interest groups have an equal influence on state policy, like orthodox 
pluralists would argue: “No government rests on universal or unbiased political 
representation; every government represents some individuals and groups more fully than 
others”. Therefore if the ENP framework is to succeed, the decisive phase of 
implementation is in the hands of the national leadership. As Treib writes, “national 
political processes have a logic of their own and […] national political actors play a 
crucial role” (Treib 2003, 4).  
Indeed, domestic political battles have affected both countries‟ ability and willingness to 
implement international norms into their legal framework. Cooperation of Moldova and 
Ukraine with the EU is determined in large part by the extent to which ruling parties and 
politicians are pro-reform and EU-minded. In fact since independence, the main 
ideological divide in both countries has been between nationalist/pro-European and 
communist/pro-Russian parties. “Communist and nationalists opposed each other on such 
key political issues as the independence of Ukraine and Moldova, foreign policy 
orientation, and language and privatization policies” (Katchanovski 2006, 67). Although 
communist parties in Moldova and Ukraine accepted market reforms and the role of 
private property, they refused at least in principle the idea of mass-privatization. 
Nationalists were mostly liberals in the European sense and supported comprehensive 
reforms towards free-market. We argue that whereas both Ukraine and Moldova have 
experienced stalemate in their transition process, such deadlocks have been greater and 
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longer when communist/pro-Russian parties were in power, and that has happened 
mostly in Moldova.  
Since achieving independence, Ukraine has sought to establish a post-Soviet identity. 
During forty years, most of Ukraine‟s identity was informed by the security dimension of 
the Cold War confrontation, and the collapse of the Soviet Union discredited the ideology 
which had been inspiring Ukrainian politics since the October Revolution. While the 
trajectory towards Europe since independence has not been linear, “a consensus has been 
built around the idea of Europe as the fulfillment of Ukraine‟s post-Soviet aspirations: a 
strong market economy, domestic stability, regional peace and security, democratic 
values, social progress and high standards of living” (Mychajlynszyn 2008, 31).  
During the tenure of Leonid Kravchuk (1991-1994), Ukraine‟s first president after 
independence, the country started to redefine its identity in non-Soviet terms and closer to 
Europe. In January 1992, Ukraine became member of the Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe, what would later become the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE). Ukraine also became the first post-Soviet state to sign the 
Partnership for Peace, a bilateral forum where former Cold War adversaries could pursue 
activities with NATO on defense cooperation, such as military exercises and joint 
seminars. Under Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004), Ukraine engaged decisively with Europe. 
At first it seemed like the incumbent Kravchuk was keener to lean towards the West 
while Kuchma wanted to keep the historical ties with the former imperial power. Indeed, 
Kuchma signed in May 1997 the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Russia. Yet, 
the European dimension of the Ukrainian identity was not forgotten. Ukraine under 
Kuchma invited the OSCE to establish a mandate in order to resolve the political status of 
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Crimea. And between 1997 and 1998 it agreed to various treaties with NATO, 
including the NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, the opening in Kiev of 
the NATO Information and Documentation Center, and the NATO-Ukraine Commission. 
During Kuchma‟s administration however, relations with Europe advanced only when 
they did not hurt the relation with Russia: “security relations with European institutions 
and the subsequent impact on the European dimension in Ukraine‟s identity were pursued 
only insofar as they did not undermine the Ukraine-Russia relationship” (Mychajlynszyn 
2008, 32).  
“If Kuchma‟s administration was a period of either/or in Ukraine‟s post-Soviet identity, 
the election of Viktor Yushchenko in the controversial 2004 presidential election 
harkened an era of „Europe and Russia‟” (Mychajlynszyn 2008, 32). It highlighted a wish 
to maintain both orientations in Ukraine‟s post-Soviet identity. “Time passed and 
discussions among policy-makers and analysts about Ukraine post-Soviet identity has 
moved away from the divisive dichotomous nature of „either Europe or Russia‟ 
perspective to one that acknowledges Ukraine‟s integration of Europe and Russia” 
(Mychajlynszyn 2008, 32). In 2004, “the role of external actors in the Orange revolution 
is frequently overestimated”, yet “there was a strong sense that Yushchenko was the 
favored candidate of the West”. “Russia did not trouble to hide its preference: it was for 
Yakunovich, pure and simple” (Copsey 2010, 35). For Russia, the Ukrainian election of 
2004 was of significant geopolitical and strategic interest. “It is a well-know aphorism 
that with Ukraine, Russia becomes an empire, and moreover, that the origins of the 
Russian empire lie to a great extent in the conquest and colonization of Ukraine and its 
victory over Poland-Lithuania for influence in that region”. Therefore, “Ukraine was a 
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crucial test of Russia‟s foreign policy and its ability to exercise decisive influence over 
its former empire. As such the outcome of the presidential election was a near-
unmitigated disaster” (Copsey 2010, 35).  
In Moldova like in Ukraine, the difficulty of implementing pro-European reforms has 
much to do with domestic political battles between nationalists and communists. The 
difference is that the broad Ukrainian consensus towards Europe is not shared in 
Moldova. In fact since independence, Moldova has been ruled either by weak nationalist 
leaders or by pro-Russian communists. In 1990 as the leader of the nationalist Popular 
Front, Mircea Snegur was elected President of the Soviet Republic of Moldova. As a 
moderate, he eventually split from his party over his opposition to the reunification with 
Romania, a demand he considered too radical. He nevertheless became the first President 
of the newly independent republic in 1991. And in 1993 and 1994, shortly after the 
Transnistrian war, President Snegur sent letters to the European Commission “urging the 
EU to develop a framework for relations with Moldova”  (Roper 2008, 85). The EU was 
not very receptive, considering that war was still being fought in the former Yugoslavia. 
In 1994, after the Democratic Agrarian Party (pro-Russian communists) captured an 
absolute majority of seats during the parliamentary elections, President Snegur had no 
choice but to realign Moldova‟s foreign policy towards Russia while neglecting Romania 
and most of Europe. Moldova then joined the Community of Independent States (CIS), 
although not its military component.  
At the subsequent presidential election in 1996, Snegur was defeated in a runoff against 
Petru Lecinschi, the speaker of the Parliament and former first secretary of the 
Communist party. Lecinschi did not fare much better, having to face a very hostile 
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Parliament and dismiss various pro-Western prime ministers. Trying to get through 
with a plebiscite, Lecinschi proposed a referendum that would have strengthened the 
executive. His attempt did not work out when the Electoral Commission declared that the 
number of voters did not exceed the minimum threshold required of 60%. A weakened 
leader, he could not do much when in 2000, Parliament abolished against his will direct 
elections of the President. Moldova became a parliamentary republic in which the 
President was elected by a vote of 2/3 of the Parliament. Mazo (2004) argues that the 
establishment of a parliamentary system with the abolishment of direct presidential 
elections allowed one party to control all branches of power and brought the end of 
democracy. While this is a bit exaggerated, it is true that the switch to a parliamentary 
system removed many checks and balances within the institutions. 
Several communist parties emerged as possible successors of the Soviet Communist 
Party of Moldova. The most organized was the Party of Communists of the Republic of 
Moldova (PCRM), which won 50,75% of the vote 71 out of 101 seats in the Parliament at 
the 25 February 2001 elections. It had no trouble electing its leader, Vladimir Voronin as 
President. The PCRM became the first unreformed communist party to be democratically 
elected in the post-Soviet space since the fall of the Berlin wall (Kennedy 2010). Voronin 
was then re-elected in 2005 within the red-orange coalition, with support from the arch-
rivals of the PCRM, the Christian Democratic People‟s Party (CDPC). After the Russian 
wine import ban of 2006, Moldova tried to reorient its exports towards the EU and away 
from Russia. Yet most economic links remained with CIS countries. Moldova intended to 
stay clear of Russian-dominated multilateral institutions, such as the Common Economic 
Space, a trade organization comprising Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. But 
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“the continuing presence of Russian troops on Moldovan soil provided another 
important source of Russian leverage over Moldovan domestic and foreign policies” 
(Roper 2008, 85) “Just as the EU was divided in how to deal with southeastern Europe, 
Moldova elites were equally divided over whether to pursue a pro-European foreign 
policy or a pro-Russian one. Ultimately, the results of the parliamentary election in 2001 
indicated a triumph for those who wanted closer cooperation with Russia” (Roper 2008, 
85).  
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Conclusion 
Why do states comply with the norms embedded in international institutions? “Scholars 
have proposed two competing answers to this compliance puzzle, one rationalist, the 
other constructivist. Rationalists emphasize coercion, cost-benefit calculations, and 
material incentives, whereas constructivists emphasize social learning, socialization, and 
social norms. Although both schools explain important aspects of compliance, the 
challenge is to build bridges between them” (Checkel 2001). This dissertation lies within 
this inter-paradigm debate and contributes to create such a bridge by exposing the 
determinants of compliance with norms in the framework of ENP.  
We demonstrate that the normative behavior of the EU in the international arena is due to 
the centrality of norms that permeate its own construction. This is the case because the 
Court gave EU treaties a quasi-constitutional value, and because post-war EU history is 
characterized by an aversion to power politics. In the EU, the predictability of law has 
come to tame sovereignty‟s most erratic behavior, both in domestic affairs and in 
relations with third countries. A notable and successful example is the enlargement 
process, whereby aspiring candidates are asked to implement the acquis communautaire 
into their national legislation in order to accede to the bloc. The most common 
explanations for the compliance motivations of EU candidates are those that emphasize 
the rational response to the incentive of membership.  
Early scholarly literature on ENP has highlighted that countries were less likely to 
comply with norms in the absence of a membership perspective. What had been 
neglected until now – and the gap this dissertation fills – is that even among countries 
without membership perspective, there is an uneven level of compliance with norms. On 
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a theoretical level, the preliminary conclusions we can draw are twofold: while 
rationalist arguments focusing on direct responses to incentives explain in large part the 
mitigated success of ENP compared with the clear modes of influence witnessed during 
the previous enlargement rounds, they fail to account for differences among ENP 
countries. This suggests that other factors are at work, unrelated to the design of the 
policy. 
We find that Moldova experiences more difficulty than Ukraine in complying with EU 
norms in the field of JHA. A compelling explanation for the differentiated integration of 
the acquis communautaire must be sought in the domestic realm of neighbouring 
countries. The first variable, contested state identities, draws clearly from constructivism 
and the literature on socialization processes, by focusing on ideational and 
identificational parameters. The second variable stresses a more rational type of 
argument, focusing on power in response to norms. Among these two factors, it would be 
both difficult and premature to identify which one is the most significant in explaining 
differentiation. An eventual research program could test these variables on other ENP 
countries.  
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Annexes 
Figure 1: Political Map of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
 
 
Source: European Commission. 2010. European Neighbourhood Policy. On line: 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm (page viewed October 10, 2010) 
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Table 1: Moldova Transit Ratings and Average Scores 
 
 
Source: Freedom House. 2009. Nations in Transit. On line: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=485 (page viewed November 11, 
2010)  
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Table 2: Ukraine Transit Ratings and Average Scores 
 
Source: Freedom House. 2009. Nations in Transit. On line: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=485 (page viewed November 11, 
2010)  
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Figure 2: Transformation towards democracy and market economy in Moldova and 
Ukraine, where 10 is the highest 
 
Source: BTI Transformation Index Atlas. 2010. Online: http://www.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/en/bti/atlas/  
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Figure 3: Transformation towards democracy in Moldova, Ukraine and the CEECs 
(except Malta and Cyprus) 
 
Source: Adapted from BTI Transformation Index. 2010. Status of Democracy and Market 
Economy. Online: http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/en/bti/ranking/ 
  
 72 
Figure 4: Percentage of ethnic Russians in Ukraine by region in the 2001 Ukrainian 
census  
 
 
Source: Kazak, K. 2007. Map of ethnic Russians in Ukraine, based on the 2001 
Ukrainian census, as a proportion of each region. Online:  
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Russians_Ukraine_2001.PNG  
 
 73 
Figure 5: Ukraine political map of the 2004 presidential election 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Wikimedia commons. 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ukraine_ElectionsMap_Nov2004.png  
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Table 3: Results of the December 26, 2004 Repeat Presidential Election in Ukraine 
 
Candidate 
Number of  votes                % of vote 
 Viktor Yushchenko   15,115,712 52 
 Viktor Yanukovych    12,848,528  44 
 
Source: http://electionresources.org/ua/president.php?election=2004  
Table 4: Results of the March 26, 2006 Parliamentary Election in Ukraine 
 
Party Votes  % Seats 
 Party of Regions    8,148,745  32.1  186  
 Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko    5,652,876  22.3  129  
 Bloc "Our Ukraine"    3,539,140  14.0  81  
 Socialist Party of Ukraine    1,444,224  5.7  33  
 Communist Party of Ukraine    929,591  3.7  21  
 People's Opposition Bloc of Natalia 
Vitrenko    743,704  2.9  0  
 Bloc of Lytvyn    619,905  2.4  0  
 Others    3,332,330  13.1  0 
 
Source: http://www.electionguide.org/results.php?ID=984  
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Table 5: Result of the September 30, 2007 Parliamentary Election in Ukraine 
Party Votes  % Seats 
 Party of Regions    8,013,895  34.4  175  
 Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko    7,162,193  30.7  156  
 Bloc "Our Ukraine - People's Self 
Defense"    3,301,282  14.2  72  
 Communist Party of Ukraine    1,257,291  5.4  27  
 Bloc of Lytvyn    924,538  4.0  20  
 Socialist Party of Ukraine    668,234  2.9  0  
 Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine    309,008  1.3  0  
 Others    661,928  2.8  0 
 
Source: http://electionresources.org/ua/deputies.php?election=2007  
 
 
Table 6: Result of the February 7, 2010 Presidential Election in Ukraine (second round) 
Candidate Votes  % 
 Viktor Yanukovych    12,481,266  49.0  
 Yulia Tymoshenko    11,593,357  45.5 
 
Source: http://electionresources.org/ua/president.php?election=2010 
